On April 28, 2025, at 12:33 p.m., a energy earthquake strike it Iberian Peninsula. L’Spain and the Portugal collapse under the weight of a brutal electric imbalance, leaving tens of millions of users without current for hours. Metros at the stop, frozen elevators, broken down telecommunications: theWestern Europe Discover, stunned, its vulnerability.
This blackout was not triggered by a shortage or a cyber attack, but by an overflow ofelectricity. That day, the sun shines intensely on the peninsula. Thanks to massive photovoltaic production, Spain generates 32,000 megawatts for a real demand for 25,000. This surplus is largely exported to France and other neighboring countries.
Behind this apparent abundance hides a little visible fragility: that of an energy system dominated, at this moment, by renewable sources Say non-synchronous. Unlike thermal or nuclear power plantssolar panels and wind turbines inject electricity into the network without providing mechanical stability. This absence of “inertia” makes the system more vulnerable to brutal frequency variations.
It is in this context that balance rocks. A first incident, similar to the sudden loss of a large power plant, immediately occurs and triggers an automatic system response. The compensation mechanisms set out, partially shocking the shock. But barely a second and a half later, a second, more intense event shakes the network: the high voltage line crossing the Pyrenees disjuncts to protect the French network. It is this moment of rupture, when Spain and Portugal are brutally isolated from the rest of Europe, which seals the fate of the Iberian network. Now without external support, with a surplus of production that has become unmanageable, the system yields under the effect of a dazzling imbalance.
In an electrical network, everything is based on frequency. If production exceeds consumption, the frequency rises. If the reverse occurs, it falls. This April 28, the Spanish frequency falls within 48 Hz – a critical threshold. Automatic protections come into play, the power stations disconnect to protect themselves. In less than ten seconds, Spain and Portugal are completely deprived of electricity.
The violence of the initial imbalance was such that it did not stop at the Iberian borders. According to European data, the electrical frequency has dropped from several hundredths of Hertz to Germany, a rare signal in the annals of the continental network. Even if the rest of Europe has avoided the cut thanks to protective mechanisms, this invisible propagation illustrates how the interconnected networks share the risks as well as resources.
Au Portugalthe effect is as immediate as it is devastating. The network, intimately linked to that of its neighbor, in turn collapses. Lisbon, Porto, the whole country finds itself plunged into darkness. But it is also in Portugal that an unexpected element will play a crucial role in the recovery: the Tapada Do Oteiro gas plant, initially planned to be put into reserve, has remained operational. This power station, with a capacity of 990 megawatts, has a strategic function: that of being able to restart in total autonomy, even in the event of a generalized failure, an asset called “Black Start”. Its role was decisive in the gradual restoration of certain Portuguese areas. So much so that the Portuguese government has announced, in the days following the crisis, that the power plant would remain active at least until 2030. A decision that perfectly illustrates the current dilemma of modern networks: how to speed up the energy transition without sacrificing the stability of the system? THE energy mix cannot be left to the logic of green energies alone. It needs diversity, flexibility, and especially means capable of responding quickly to the unexpected.
Morocco, interconnected but preserved
While the Iberian peninsula sank into the darkness, Morocco, although directly interconnected, remained away from the storm. This stability is based on several technical and organizational foundations which have proven their effectiveness, without guaranteeing invulnerability.
The specificity of Morocco-Spain interconnection played a decisive role. Unlike synchronous European networks, the link that crosses the Strait of Gibraltar Works in high voltage direct current (HVDC). This architecture acts as a natural barrier: in the event of a serious frequency imbalance in the neighbor, the converters automatically block, insulating the Moroccan network of instability. This is what happened on April 28, allowing Morocco to stay away from blackout.
But this passive protection is not enough to explain the holding of the network. Morocco has also quickly activated its internal resources to compensate for the sudden loss of imports. Gas turbines, regulatory generators and other means of production were asked in a few minutes to maintain the balance between supply and demand.
This operational success is based on a electric mesh robust. The Moroccan transport network is structured around very high voltage lines (400 kV and 225 kV) which connect the production centers to large consumption centers. This spider canvas architecture makes it possible to redirect the flows in the event of a cut on a section and limits the risk of domino effect.
The other pillar of this resilience, less visible but just as strategic, is the Scada system (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition). It is a computer platform that supervises the national network parameters in real time: voltages, frequencies, charges, state of lines and posts. From the National Driving Center, based in Casablanca, operators can monitor the entire territory and trigger automatic or manual actions to preserve the stability of the system.
However, the effectiveness of such a device should never make us forget that no network is immune. A breakdown is not always the fruit of an external error: it can also arise from an internal defect, a simultaneous failure of critical equipment, a relaxation in maintenance or even an extreme natural hazard. This is why rigor in infrastructure maintenance is essential. The quality of the service is largely based on regular audit, testing, protection control and verification of electromechanical equipment.
Added to this is the need for each actor in the network to have a Activity continuity plan (PCA) Robust. In crisis, every second counts. Knowing who does what, how to relaunch a position, how to relieve without jeopardizing hospitals or command centers is a discipline that talks by training, simulations and experience.
The ability of Black Start, that is to say the possibility of restarting part of the network without external support, is another fundamental lever. Hydroelectric power plants like that of Afourer, or soon that of Abdelmoumen, are able to operate independently and recreate islets of electricity which can then be synchronized with each other. This ability to “rekindle” the country in stages, from several households, is what distinguishes a network capable of recovering from a major crisis from a bunch.
The Iberian lesson thus recalls, with force, that resilience cannot be decreed: it is built, maintains itself and tests itself. Morocco has demonstrated its robustness. But in a context of accelerated energy transition and more unstable climate, staying vigilant is more than ever a requirement. Because in terms of electricity, the danger does not always come from elsewhere. And because it takes a poorly contained incident for black to win, without warning.
In this perspective, Morocco already explores new axes of regional cooperation. A direct interconnection project with Portugal, also using direct current, is being studied. It would diversify the entry points to Europe while increasing the export capacity of the kingdom. Further south, discussions are also initiated to strengthen connections to West Africa. These openings, if they materialize, could make Morocco a real energy crossroads between Europe and Africa, provided they maintain the stability standards which allowed it, on April 28, to stay under tension when others sank.
